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I

IN TUE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELDON L. ANDERSON, dba
SILVER DOLLAR LOUNGE,
Appellant,
Case No. 15653

vs.
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, YUKUS Y.
INOUYE, KARL R. LYMAN,
and KENNETH J. PINEGAR,
as Commissioners,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant initiated this action in the Fourth
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, praying
for an Extraordinary Writ to review and reverse the ruling
by the Board of County Commissioners of Utah County which
denied the appellant a business license.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Fourth DistriC't Court,

in and for Utah County.

State of Utah, the Uonorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge
presiding, entered its Order dismissing the plaintiff/appella 111
complaint, no cause of action, on the basis that the Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

County Commission has the absolute authority to deny the
issuance of a Class B Beer license without cause.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek an affirmation of the District
Court's

decision and findings that the Utah County Commission

has absolute authority to deny issuing a Class B Beer license
without cause.

Respondents seek an order denying appellant's

request for a restraining order pending the final determination
of the plaintiff/appellant's second cause of action, in the
event that this Court upholds the Lower Court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents respectfully disagree with the
statement of facts as presented to this Court in the Brief
of the Appellant in the following areas:
1.

Page 3.

Appellant states that the Sheriff was

proceeding under Section 7-6-2 of the Utah County Ordinances
when he refused to rrcommend approval of the appellant's
license.

In fact,

the Sheriff was proceeding under Section

4-2-6 of the Utah County Ordinances, wherein the following
language is found:
"The application for such license, together .with
such information and certificate as is required
by the County to be attached theret~, shall be
referred to the Sheriff for inspection and report.
The said Sheriff shall, within five days aft:r
receiving such application, make report to t e
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2

Commission of lhe g<'nl'ral rpputation and charactpr
of the persons who habitually frequent such' placf'.
the nature and kind of businPss conducted at
such plan-' by the applicant, or by any other person
or by said applicant at any other place; whether
said place is or has been conducted in a lawful,
quiet and orderly mannPr; the nature and kind of
entertainment, if any, al said place, whether
gambling is or has bPen p<•rmitted upon the premisr,
or by said applicant at any other place; and he
shall add thereto hh; recommendation as to granting I
or denying said appliC'ation.
Upon receipt of said
report, the Commission shall act upon the applicatio·
as it sha 11 deem fair. just and proper in regard to I
granting or denying the same."
·
1'

2.

Page 3.

Appellant alleges that no specific

charges were ever filed against the appellant by the Utah
County Attorney or the Sheriff regarding the premises being
a nuisance.

However, specific charges were filed against the

appellant for

serving beer to minors in violation of

municipal ordinance and state law.

The appellant was convictea f

in City Court, but the conviction was reversed on appeal to
the Fourth District Court on the grounds of entrapment.
3.

Page 4.

Utah County Attorney merely

stipulat~

to certain facts in the appellant's Memorandum of Authorities
(R-8, 9, 10) and not to the Memorandum of Authorities in its
entirety.

The remaining Statement of Facts as set forth in

appellant's Brief appear to be correct.
i ·.'

!

· i'

ARGUMENT

l

'·~

:-. ·:

\ t:

J

L

POINT I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT

3
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I

THE UTAH COUNTY COMMISSIONERS HAD THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO DENY
APPELLANT'S CLASS B BEER LICENSE.
Section 32-4-17 UCA ( 1953) confers upon the County
the authority to rPgulate thP sale of light beer.

This section

reads in part as follows:
"Cities and towns within their corporate limits
and counties outside of incorporated cities and'
towns shall have power to license, tax, regulate
or prohibit the sale of light beer, at retail in
bottles or draft; provided, that no such lice~ses
shall be granted to sell beer in any dance hall,
theater or in the proximity of any church or school.
The commission granting the license shall have
authority to detf~rmine in each case what shall
constitute proximity." (emphasis added)
It appears to be well settled that a state may
delegate power to regulate and prohibit the sale of alcoholic
beverages.

State v. Briggs, 46 Utah 288, 146 P. 261.
The appellant contends that the power to regulate

and prohibit Class B

Beer license by the County Commission

is limited and that they may not absolutely refuse to issue
licenses for the sale of beer.

The great weight of authority

holds that procedural due process nePd not be afforded where a
liquor license is r:evoke.d or denied.
V. Randall,

State ex. rel. Garrett

527 S.W.2d 366, 371 (Mo.1975); Smith v. Iowa

Liquor Control Commission, 169 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Iowa 1959);
Nelson v. Hopper, 383 P.2d 588, 590 (Idaho 1963).
The rationale for this general rule is stated in
2 A.L.R.2d 1239, at page 1242:

i'

I

rl

I~

1f

I
I

4
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"It is well settlPd that licenses issued for the
sale of intoxicating liquors or beverages have no
quality of a eontracL or of property, but are merelv
temporary permits to do what otherwise would be an·
offense against th<' law - that such a license is a
mere privi legr to carry on a busin(~Ss subject to the
will or the grantor. and is not a contract betwe(•n
the licensee and the govrrnment, or property or a
vested right."

In Shaw v. Orem City, 117 Utah 288 (1950) the Suprernfl
o/

Court ruled that the legislature intended that the sale of light[
I

beer be regulated solely by the State Liquor Commission and
local authorities.

The Court indicated that a beer license

constitutes no property interest.

The liquor license is merely

a privilege conferred upon a licensee and subject to denial
without

affording due process at the will of the grantor.

Court cited 46-0-131 UCA (1943) which is essentially the same
as 32-4-17 UCA (1953), supra.
. I

The appellant is proceeding under the mistaken not1m1
that the criteria for denying his application is founded in
7-6-1 and 7-6-2 of the Utah County Revised Ordinances.
7-6-1 and 7-6-2 concern revocation
issue presently be fore the Court,

Section>

and do not address the
namely,

the procedural

requirements for granting <>r denying application for beer
licenses.

The applicable ordinance is 4-2-6 as stated supra

in the defendant's Statement of Facts.

This ordianance contain>

no provision that the commission exercise an objective standa~
of due process in making their determination nor is there any
state statute which so provides.

5
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.I

In Riggins~ __[Li_strict Court of Salt Lake Cit}'..
89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645, thr· Court made it perfectly clear
that the StatP had th<' authority to prohibit it's inhabitant 8
from importing liquor into designated places where such
liquors were sold illegally as common nuisances.

Such

authority has bePn conferred un the State Liquor Commission
under the Liquor Control Act and conferred upon the County
under Section 32-4-1 UCA ( 1953).

The exercise of this

authority is not contrary to any U.S. constitutional provision.
The Court in Riggins supra further went on to say that the
legislature intended to vest full power to control the liquor
business in the Liquor Commission.

This same power is also

conferred upon the towns, cities and counties under Section
32-4-17 UCA (1953).

·section 32-4-8 UCA (1953) is indicative
It reads as follows:

of this legislative intent.

"The Commission, with or without a hearing, may at
its discretion refuse to grant any license or
permit applied for, and may revoke any license or
permit at any time; and in no such case need any
cause be stated. The acts of the Commission in
giving or withholding consent or in granting,
denying, or revoking licenses or permits s~all not
be subject to any review whatever, except in the
cases in which such action has been procured by fraud.
If at any time a licensee or permittee.shall cea~e to
possess all of the qualifications requir:d by this
act it shall be the duty of the Commission to
rev~ke his license or permit. All li~enses and
t
permits shall have incorporated therein ~he statemen
that they are granted subject to revocation as
provided in this act."

6
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Historically the liquor business has not stood in
the same plane as other public administrative agencies, and
the ruling of the Fourth District Court should be affirmed.
POINT II
THAT EVEN IF DUE PROCESS IS A REQUIREMENT TO TURN
DOWN AN APPLICATION FOR A CLASS B BEER LICENSE, APPELLANT WAS
NOT DENIED ANY RIGHT TO WHICH HE WAS ENTITLED, NOR DID THE
COUNTY COMMISSION ACT ARBITRARILY OR CAPRICIOUSLY.
Assuming arguendo that the County Commission is
subject to the same restrictions and the same criteria as
other administrative agencies in granting or denying license
applications, in this particular action of the Commission the
denial of the application submitted by appellant was based on
substantial evidence and thus it cannot be said that the
decision of the Commission was arbitrary or capricious.
The general rule concerning judicial review of
.administrative hearings other than those pertaining to liquor
control, appears to be best stated in 42 Am Jur2nd "Public
Administration" Section 209 at Page 610:
"In general, in the absence of valid statutory
provisions or other factors affecting the scope
and extent of judicial review, administrative
determinations will not be interferred with by
the courts unless, but will interfere with where,
the determination is beyond the power which could
constitutionally be vested in or exercised by
an administrative authority; the determination is
without or in excess of the statutory powers and
jurisdiction of the administrative authority,
the determination is in exercise of power so
arbitrary or unreasonable as virtually to transcend

7
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the authority conferred, or is otherwise an abuse
of discreti6n, or is in disregard of the fundamental
rules_of ~ne due process of law, as required by the
const1tut1on or statutory directions ... "
In Central Bank and Trust Company v. Brimhall,
28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P.2d 638, the plaintiff (Central Bank)
appealled the decision of the Bank Commissioner which granted
an application to First Security Corporation to establish a
bank in Springville, Utah, but denied the application of the
plaintiff.

Central Bank contended that the decision of the

Commissioner was arbitrary and capricious.

In affirming the

Commissioner's findings, the Utah Supreme Court stated as
follows:
"Our duty is to look upon the whole evidence in
the light favorable to the determination made by
the Bank Commissioner in the trial court, and to
sustain them if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence to justify doing so." (at 641)
The Court further went on to say:
" ... (T]he well established rule is that the courts
iuau1ge [the Commissioner] latitude in determinations
he makes on questions of fact and also in the
exercise of his discretion with respect to the
responsibilities which the law imposes upon him;
and they will not interfere therewith unless it
appears that he acted in excess of his powers, or·
that he so abused his discretion that his action was
capricious or arbitrary." (at 641)
This quote (reasonable basis) spoken of in Central
Bank supra was earlier defined as the "substantial evidence"
in Uintah Freight Lines v. Public Service Commission, 119 Utah
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491, 229 P.2d 675, wherein the Court stated:
"It is not required that the facts found by the
Commission be conclusively established, nor even
that they be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence.
If there is in the record competent
evidence from which a reasonable mind could believe
or conclude that a certain fact existed, a finding
of such facts finds justification in the evidence,
and we cannot disturb it." (at 677)
Mulchay v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245,
117 P.2d 298, 299.

This substantial evidence test was again

applied in Zions First National Bank v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d
239, 390 P.2d 854, (1964) where the Supreme Court affirmed
the Commissioner's decision and ruled that the Courts will not
overrule the Commissioner's decision if supported by "any
substantial evidence" and is not arbitrary or capricious,
Id at 855.

This substantial evidence rule is also set out in

Davis Administrative Law Text, Section 29.01 at 525 (1972).
It should be noted again that the case presently
before the Court deals with the denial of an application and
not with the revocation of a beer license.

A previous license

granted by the Commission to the appellant was terminated by
the terms of the license and not by some affirmative revocation
procedure.
A failure to grant a license is inherent and the
applicant should be reasonably aware of such.

The appellant

cites authorities which are concerned with the issue of
revocation and then applied these holdings to the issue of

9
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application denial as presently before the Court.

A revocation

and a denial of an application are clearly distinguishable.
35 A.L.R.2d 1067, 1068; Casala v. Dio, 13 A.2d 693, 65 RI 96
(1940).
In Richardson v. Perales 402 U.S. 389, 91

s.

Ct.

1420, (1970), the United States Supreme Court ruled that
reports in administrative hearings are admissible and may
constitute substantial evidence supportive

of a finding made

by a hearing examiner against a claimant despite its heresay
character, absence of cross examination and presence of opposing
direct testimony by the claimant himself.

In Richardson supra,

the Court ruled that the level of due process required in
administrative hearings is flexible and may vary.

At page

1427, the Court stated:
"The extent to which procedural due process must
be afforded the recipient is influenced by the
extent to which he may be condemned to suffer
grevious loss.
Accordingly consideration of what
procedures due process may require under any given
set of circumstances must begin with a determination
of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action."
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-263, 90 S Ct.
1011, 1018, 25 L. ed. 2d 287 (1970).

The Court further went

on to hold that the evidence need only be relevant to be
admitted.

That the hearing should be informal so as to be

understandable by the layman claimant and that the decision of

10
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the hearing examiner be supported by substantial evidence.
The Supreme Court went on to define "substantial evidence" as
being "more than a mere scintilla.

It means such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to

support a conclusion." (at 1427)
In the case presently before the Court, the County
Commission granted the appellant two administrative hearings,
and based its decision upon substantial evidence.

At the

time of both hearings, the Commissioners had before them a
copy of the Sheriff's recommendation and copies of official
incident and offense police reports concerning the Silver
Lounge.

Doi~

These official reports indicated that over a six

month period, the Sheriff's department had been summoned to the
appellant's place of business to quiet disturbances and/or
make arrests.

In addition, Officer Scott testified at the

August 6th, 1976 hearing, of violations he personally
encountered while conducting spot checks on the premises.

The '

administrative record also shows that the appellant admitted
the following:
1.

That he was convicted of a felony.

Utah County

Ordinance Section 4-2-7 holds that a convicted felon cannot
qualify for a beer license.
2.

That the appellant had permitted minors on

11
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premises in violation of Utah County Ordinance Section
4-2-18.
3.

That the appellant did willfully sell beer to

patrons after hours in violation of County Ordianances.
The findings and the admissions stated above
constitutes sufficient grounds for the denial of a Class B
Beer license by the County Commission.

The record clearly

indicated that the County Commission had before it substantial
evidence from which to justify their denial.
Pehrson v. City Council of Ephraim, 14 Utah 147,
46 P. 657, is cited by the appellant in his brief as authority
for his position.
revocation and,

However, Pehrson dealt with the issue of

in addition, the decision of the Court was

based upon an 1892 statute which is no longer law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
Trial Court should be affirmed:
1.

The State of Utah has conferred upon it's

Counties the absolute authority to grant or deny applications
for beer licenses.
2.

Even if the County did not have absolute

authority, the County Commission did not act arbitrarily nor
did it act capriciously in denying the application of the
appellant.

After affording appellant due process, the

12
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decision of the respondent is supported by substantial eviden~
Respectfully submitted,

Guy R. Burningham
Deputy Utah County Attorney
Attorney for Respondents
60 South University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to Matt Biljanic, Attorney for Appellut.
7355 South 9th East, Midvale, Utah, 84047, postage prepaid,
this

day of

Guy R. Burningham
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